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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
TIMOTHY HIDALGO,
Plaintiff,

19-cv-10545 (JGK)

- against -

OPINION & ORDER

AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION OF THE UNITED
STATES, INC.,
Defendant.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The defendant, the Amateur Athletic Union of the United
States, Inc. (the “AAU”), moves to compel arbitration on the
claims brought by the plaintiff, Timothy Hidalgo, for common law
negligence, negligence per se, and breach of implied contract,
as well as for statutory violations of the New York General
Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) and the Rhode Island
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1. All
the plaintiff’s claims arise out of a data breach that allegedly
resulted in financial losses, identity theft, and other injuries
to people, like the plaintiff, who had personal information,
including credit card and debit card information, stored with
the AAU. The defendant also moves to stay this litigation
pending arbitration.
For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration and its motion to stay this action pending
arbitration are granted.
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I.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise
indicated.
A.
The AAU is a non-profit, volunteer-based, multi-sport event
organization that promotes and develops amateur sports and
physical fitness programs for youths and adults. Kimbrell Decl.
¶ 2. Individuals may apply to become members of the AAU as
athletes or non-athletes; the latter category includes coaches,
administrators, managers, instructors, and officials. Id.
Individuals may apply for AAU membership by filling out an
online application at https://aausports.org (the “Website”). Id.
at ¶¶ 3, 6 & Ex. A.
The AAU online membership application contains many
questions that require the applicant to answer. At the end of
the application is a section that is replicated here:
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Kimbrell Decl., Ex. A.
Before submitting the application by clicking the green
“Continue” button in the bottom right corner, an applicant must,
among other things, check a box that appears to the immediate
left of the words “*I understand and agree to all terms and
conditions listed.” Kimbrell Decl. at ¶¶ 6-8 (bold and color in
original). The check box and the accompanying text appear at the
bottom of a yellow box in the application immediately below the
bold heading “Terms and Conditions – Digital Signature.” Id.
(bold in original). One of the statements in the “terms and
conditions” section of the application is the statement that
Membership in any category may be granted only after
an application is submitted and approved. By
submitting an application, the applicant agrees to
comply with the provisions of the AAU Code, including
its constitution, bylaws, policies, procedures,
regulations, and rules.
Id. at ¶ 7 (color in original). The blue text is a hyperlink
that takes the applicant to a separate “AAU Code Book” screen.
Id. at ¶ 8. Also in the “terms and conditions” section is the
statement “*I accept all terms and conditions for this AAU
membership application as laid out by the AAU code book
(available here) and this application.” Id. (color in original).
The blue text, “available here,” is another hyperlink that takes
the applicant to the same AAU Code Book screen. Id.
Additionally, in the green box in the “terms and conditions”
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section of the application is the statement “By entering my name
below, I hereby authorize AAU to create the requested
membership, accept and acknowledge all terms and conditions
presented to me during the application process.” Id. at Ex. A.
Regardless which of the two hyperlinks one uses to access
the AAU Code Book screen from the application page, the
resulting page that a user is taken to displays the table of
contents of the AAU Code Book. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11 & Ex. B. On the
table of contents page, a complete PDF version of the AAU Code
Book can be accessed by clicking on a button near the top of the
AAU Code Book screen labeled “Complete Book.” Id. at Ex. B. The
AAU Code Book screen also contains hyperlinks to each chapter
contained within the AAU Code Book, one of which is titled
“Policies.” Id. Adjacent to the “Policies” heading in the table
of contents on the AAU Code Book screen is a hyperlink that
reads “AAU National Policies of the AAU.” Id. (underline and
color in original). In the “Policies” section of the table of
contents, the first subheading is labeled “Membership Policy”
and a sub-subheading below the “Membership Policy” subheading is
labeled “Binding Arbitration.” Id. Upon clicking on the
hyperlink labeled “AAU National Policies of the AAU,” the web
user is then directed to a screen that displays the specific
pages of the larger AAU Code Book containing the “AAU National
Policies.” Id. at ¶¶ 11-12 & Ex. C.
5
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The “Binding Arbitration” provision contained in the AAU
National Policies, which appears in bold text and in capital
letters, reads as follows:
B. BINDING ARBITRATION
1. BY APPLYING FOR AAU MEMBERSHIP (OR HAVING A THIRD
PARTY SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE
AAU ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT), OR UPON ENTERING
ANY AAU EVENT, THE APPLICANT/MEMBER/ENTRANT AND THE
AAU AGREE TO SUBMIT ALL CIVIL DISPUTE(S) ARISING OUT
OF OR DURING THE TERM OF MEMBERSHIP TO BINDING
ARBIRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION (“AAA”) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CONSUMER
ARBITRATION RULES. THE ARBITRATION HEARING SHALL BE
HELD IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK BEFORE ONE (1)
ARBITRATOR.
2. DEPOSITION(S), REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS ARE STRICTLY
DISCOURAGED AND WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHOUT AN ORDER
FROM AAA; AND, IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED, A REQUEST
FOR ANY SUCH ORDER, IF ANY, SHALL ACCOMPANY THE
FILING OF THE APPLICABLE PARTY’S FIRST SUBMISSION TO
AAA OR SUCH REQUEST SHALL BE WAIVED AND/OR DENIED. A
LIST OF WITNESSES AND ALL EXHIBITS TO BE INTRODUCED
AT THE HEARING WILL BE EXCHANGED AT LEAST TWENTY
(20) DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEARING. THE PARTIES AGREE
THAT THE BINDING ARBITRATION SHALL BE IN LIEU OF ANY
LITIGATION BY AND BETWEEN ALL OF THE PARTIES RELATED
TO THE DISPUTE.
3. THE PARTIES DECLARE THAT IT IS THEIR CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE INTENT FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO DETERMINE
ANY AND ALL QUESTIONS OF ARBITRABILITY, IF ANY. ANY
OBJECTION TO THE ARBITRATOR’S JURISDICTION,
INCLUDING ANY OBJECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
EXISTENCE, SCOPE OR VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT SHALL BE DECIDED BY THE ARBITRATOR.
4. THE PARTIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN
LEGAL FEES, COSTS AND COST OF WITNESSES. THE PARTIES
WILL SHARE EQUALLY THE ARBITRATOR’S FEES AND COSTS.
THE PARTIES WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO SEEK AND THE PARTIES
COVENANT NOT TO SEEK, ANY PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES.
Id. at ¶ 13 & Ex. C.
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On May 16, 2019, the plaintiff applied for membership with
the AAU by filling out an application on the Website. Kimbrell
Decl. ¶ 4. 1 The plaintiff used his debit card to pay the $32.00
fee for a coach’s certificate at the time he submitted his
application. Compl. ¶ 19. The plaintiff applied for membership
by accessing the Website on the Safari web browser application
on his iPhone. Hidalgo Decl. ¶¶ 4-7. Because he used his iPhone
to complete the membership application the plaintiff allegedly
“had to move the screen back and forth for each line of text. By
pinching [his] fingers together on the screen [he] could zoom
out and see more of the Application, but even then the full
application was not visible and it would pop back to the
misconfigured size when [he] lifted [his] fingers from the
screen.” Id. at ¶ 7 & Ex. A. Nevertheless, the plaintiff states
that the image of the membership application reproduced above
“may well be essentially the same as the application [he] filled
out in May 2019, although . . . due to the lack of mobile
compatibility, he never saw it formatted as a unified document.”
Id. at ¶ 8. The plaintiff states that he “remember[s] a section
that talked about terms and conditions for background check and
another yellow box that talked about terms and conditions of

1

The plaintiff alleges that he applied for membership with the AAU on or
about May 17, 2019. Compl. ¶ 19. The defendant alleges that the May 16, 2019
date comes from a review of business records maintained by the AAU in the
ordinary course of business. Kimbrell Decl. ¶ 4. Any discrepancy between the
two dates is not material in this case.
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membership. The second terms and conditions box talked about how
membership was not guaranteed by just filling out the
application and that members had to comply with the AAU Code and
its constitution and rules.” Id. at ¶ 10.
When the plaintiff applied for membership he necessarily
checked the box in the “terms and conditions” section adjacent
to the statement “*I understand and agree to all terms and
conditions listed” because, had he not checked the box, an error
message would have popped up on the screen when he attempted to
click the “Continue” button at the bottom right of the
application. Kimbrell Decl. ¶ 9. The plaintiff’s membership was
accepted by the AAU on May 29, 2019, roughly two weeks after he
applied, and the plaintiff thereafter became eligible to
participate in the AAU’s youth program as a coach or other kind
of volunteer. Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. B.
B.
Private information, including credit and debit card
information, of individuals who conducted transactions on the
Website between October 1, 2018 and July 2, 2019, including that
information from the plaintiff, was subject to a data breach
that the AAU publicly disclosed in September 2019. Compl. ¶ 3.
The plaintiff generally alleged in the Complaint that the AAU
“failed to take reasonable steps to employ adequate security
measures or to properly protect sensitive payment Personal
8
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Information” and that in the aftermath of the breach, AAU’s
actions in remedying the injuries of victims of the breach were
inadequate. See generally id. at ¶¶ 33-66.
On November 13, 2019, the plaintiff brought this case as a
class action on behalf of “[a]ll residents of the United States
whose Personal Information was compromised as a result of the
data breach first disclosed by AAU in September 2019.” Id. at
¶ 67. The plaintiff brought claims for common-law negligence,
negligence per se, breach of implied contract, unjust
enrichment, violations of the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, §§ 6-13.1-1 et seq., and violations of the New
York General Business Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §

349(a). Id. at

¶¶ 78-134.
The defendant now moves moves pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., to compel
arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims and stay the case pending
arbitration.
II.
Under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4, “a district court must enter
an order to arbitrate upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n.27 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). A
court considering whether to compel arbitration pursuant to a
9
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purported arbitration agreement must decide “(1) whether there
exists a valid agreement to arbitrate at all under the contract
in question . . . and if so, (2) whether the particular dispute
sought to be arbitrated falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.” Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Swiss
Reinsurance Am. Corp., 246 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The determination of whether parties have contractually
bound themselves to arbitrate a dispute – a determination
involving interpretation of state law – is a legal conclusion.”
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 (2d Cir.
2002) (Sotomayor, J.). Thus, “[w]hen deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter,” courts generally
“should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Rightnour v. Tiffany & Co.,
239 F. Supp. 3d 744, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “It is a basic
tenet of contract law that, in order to be binding, a contract
requires a ‘meeting of the minds’ and a manifestation of mutual
assent.’” Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 288 (2d
Cir. 2019). 2 “When an offeree does not have actual notice of
certain contract terms, he is nevertheless bound by such terms

2

The parties agree that New York law should govern in this case.
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if he is on inquiry notice of them and assents to them through
conduct that a reasonable person would understand to constitute
assent.” Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
“New commerce on the Internet . . . has not fundamentally
changed the principles of contract.” Register.com v. Verio,
Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). Applying ordinary
contract law principles, courts routinely uphold “‘clickwrap’
(or ‘clickthrough’) agreements, which require users to click an
‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and
conditions of use” “for the principal reason that the user has
affirmatively assented to the terms of agreement by clicking ‘I
agree.’” Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir.
2017) (applying California law but noting that New York and
California apply substantially the same rules for determining
whether there has been mutual assent necessary to form a
contract). However, in order to be bound by an arbitration
agreement contained in a clickwrap agreement, the web-user must
have “reasonable notice of the arbitration provision.” Starke,
913 F.3d at 292; see also Feld v. Postmates, Inc., -- F. Supp.
3d --, 2020 WL 1047055, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2020).
Upon satisfying itself that an agreement to arbitrate
exists, the district court must then decide whether the claims
at issue are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74. When there are issues concerning the
11
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scope of an arbitration agreement and whether particular
disputes sought to be arbitrated fall within that scope, also
known as issues of arbitrability, those issues are generally
“for judicial determination ‘unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.’” NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS
Securities, LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1031 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002));
see also Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205,
208-09 (2d Cir. 2005).
“In deciding motions to compel, courts should apply a
‘standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary
judgment.’” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir.
2016) (quoting Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d
Cir. 2003)). Thus, a court should “consider all relevant,
admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits” and “must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.
(internal quotation marks, alteration and citations omitted).
The court must order arbitration “if there is no genuine issue
of material fact regarding the requirements to compel
arbitration.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Beelman
Truck Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

12
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III.
The first question is whether the plaintiff and the
defendant entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to
arbitrate. With respect to this question, the parties dispute
only whether the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” of the
arbitration provision contained in the AAU Code Book sufficient
for the plaintiff to manifest assent to the terms of the
arbitration provision by virtue of completing the AAU membership
application and becoming a member of the AAU.
A.
When determining whether a plaintiff assented to the terms
of a web-based contract, courts “look to the design and content
of the relevant interface to determine if the contract terms
were presented to the offeree in a way that would put her on
inquiry notice of such terms.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 289. In a
series of recent cases, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Meyer v. Uber
Technologies, and Starke v. SquareTrade, the Court of Appeals
has developed a framework for determining whether a web user has
“reasonable notice” of an arbitration provision contained in a
document that can be accessed through a hyperlink provided to
the user. See Starke, 913 F.3d at 292 (“The reasoning of Nicosia
and Meyer provides the framework within which we analyze the
validity of assent to terms and conditions presented through a
web interface.”).
13
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In Nicosia, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff
had plausibly pleaded that he was not bound by Amazon.com’s
Conditions of Use when he placed an online order. 3 The Amazon.com
order page contained language near the top of the page that “By
placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and
conditions of use,” where “privacy notice” and conditions of
use” were hyperlinks in blue font. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235-36,
241. In finding that the plaintiff had plausibly pleaded that
there was no constructive notice of Amazon.com’s conditions of
use, the Court of Appeals noted a number of facts about the
layout of the Amazon.com order page that, taken together,
deprived the plaintiff of “reasonable notice” of the conditions
of use that would purportedly become binding upon placing an
order with Amazon.com. These facts included that “the critical
sentence appears in smaller font” than the “Review your order
heading”; “unlike typical ‘clickwrap’ agreements, clicking
‘Place your order’ does not specifically manifest assent to the
additional terms, for the purchaser is not specifically asked
whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree’”; the message alerting a
user that placing the order constituted agreement to be bound by
the conditions of use was not “bold, capitalized, or conspicuous
in light of the whole webpage”; and the page itself contained

3

The court in Nicosia applied Washington law to the question of contract
formation, but “Washington law is the same as New York law with respect to
the issue of contract formation.” Starke, 913 F.3d at 290 n.7.
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“between fifteen and twenty-five links on the Order Page, and
various text is displayed in at least four font sizes and six
colors . . . alongside multiple buttons and promotional
advertisements.” Id. at 235-37.
In Meyer, the Court of Appeals enforced an arbitration
provision contained in the “terms of service & privacy policy”
that could be accessed on the registration screen of the Uber
smartphone application. 868 F.3d at 81. In finding that a user
would have reasonable notice of the existence of the arbitration
provision, the Court of Appeals noted at the outset that
“precedent and basic principles of contract law instruct that we
consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent smartphone
user,” and that “a reasonably prudent smartphone user knows that
text that is highlighted in blue and underlined is hyperlinked
to another webpage where additional information will be found.”
Id. at 77-78. The Court of Appeals found that the Uber
smartphone interface provided “reasonable notice” based on a
number of facts about the layout of the interface, namely that
the screen was “uncluttered”; the “text, including the
hyperlinks to the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy,
appears directly below the buttons for registration”; “the dark
print contrasts with the bright white background, and the
hyperlinks are in blue and underlined”; the “notice of the Terms
of Service is provided simultaneously to enrollment”; and
15
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“[o]nce a user clicks through to the Terms of Service, the
section heading (‘Dispute Resolution’) and the sentence waiving
the user’s right to a jury trial on relevant claims are both
bolded.” Id. at 78-79.
In Starke, the Court of Appeals found that a user did not
have reasonable notice of an arbitration provision that could be
accessed through a “terms and conditions” hyperlink contained in
the confirmation email of a purchase made on Amazon.com. 913
F.3d at 285. In finding that the plaintiff did not have
reasonable notice of the provision that could be accessed
through the “terms and conditions” hyperlink, the Court of
Appeals noted that the company that sought to compel arbitration
had “never directed Starke’s attention to the ‘Terms &
Conditions’ hyperlink that contained the post-Sale T&C”; the
information unrelated to the terms and conditions hyperlink
“took up approximately half of the email”; the hyperlink itself
“is some of the smallest text in the email and comes after
several prompts unrelated to the enclosure of the contract”; the
“interface here is cluttered with diverse text, displayed in
multiple colors, sizes and fonts, and features various buttons
and promotional advertisements that distract the reader from the
relevant hyperlink”; the subsequent “email in no way signals to
Starke that he should click on the link, and it does not advise
him that he would be deemed to agree to the contract terms in
16
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the document to be found by clicking that link”; and the terms
and conditions were both spatially and temporally decoupled from
the purchase that Starke had made on Amazon.com. Id. at 292-94.
These cases make clear that the inquiry whether a web user
had “reasonable notice” of contract terms contained in a
contract accessible by hyperlink depends on the “totality of the
circumstances.” Id. at 296; Feld, 2020 WL 1047055, at *3
(“Whether a user is on inquiry notice is a fact-intensive
analysis.”) (citing Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76). These cases provide
the framework for the inquiry in this case as to whether the
plaintiff assented to the arbitration provision contained in the
AAU Code Book by submitting his application for membership in
the AAU and becoming a member of the AAU.
B.
In this case, the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” that by
completing his application for AAU membership and becoming a
member of the AAU, he would be bound by contractual language
contained in the documents, including the binding arbitration
provision, that could be accessed through the hyperlinks on the
AAU application page. On the Website, an applicant’s “attention
is adequately directed to a conspicuous hyperlink that is
clearly identified as containing contractual terms to which the
customer manifests assent” by completing the AAU membership
application. Starke, 913 F.3d at 296. An applicant has
17
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“reasonable notice” of the arbitration provision contained in
the AAU Code Book based on several facts about the layout of the
AAU membership application page.
First, the AAU application page is relatively uncluttered.
The relevant part of the application page is labeled “Terms and
Conditions – Digital Signature” in large bold font. The section
is in a distinctive yellow color. Within that section, the
provisions of the AAU Code that a member agrees to comply with
can be accessed through the hyperlinks and are marked with the
distinctive blue color characteristic of hyperlinks. 4 Although
the membership application page has various colors, the layout
is not distracting like the layout of the web page in Nicosia in
which there were “between fifteen and twenty-five links,” in
text of “at least four font sizes and six colors,” and various
buttons and advertisements. 834 F.3d at 237. The relevant text
in the “terms and conditions” box on the AAU application screen
clearly draws a reasonable user’s attention to it because of the
blue hyperlinks, the red asterisks, the normal font size, and
the clear contrast between the mostly black text and the yellow
background. See Peter v. DoorDash, Inc., -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020

4

The plaintiff suggests that a reasonable user would be confused by the fact
that there were multiple different terms and conditions. But as the plaintiff
himself admits, he “remember[s] a section that talked about terms and
conditions for background check and another yellow box that talked about
terms and conditions of membership.” Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 10. There are two
hyperlinks inside the “Terms and Conditions” box on the application and both
hyperlinks would take a web user to the same AAU Code Book screen.

18
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WL 1967568, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (“DoorDash’s sign-up
page looks markedly similar to the page approved by
Meyer . . . Despite plaintiff’s characterization of the font as
gray-on-gray, the text contrasts clearly with the background and
is plainly readable.”). The “terms and conditions” box is also
prominently placed squarely in the middle of the very end of the
application, which is a conspicuous part of the application
because it is the last place an applicant looks before finishing
the application process.
Second, although the court in Meyer noted that reasonable
notice was given, in part, because “the entire screen [was]
visible at once, and the user [did] not need to scroll beyond
what [was] immediately visible to find notice of the Terms of
Service,” 868 F.3d at 78, the fact that an applicant would have
to scroll down through many pages of the application to reach
the terms and conditions box does not undermine the plaintiff’s
assent to those terms and conditions. An applicant for AAU
membership would be unable to avoid the part of the application
containing the hyperlinks leading to the AAU Code Book because
the applicant would necessarily proceed through the application
in linear fashion and could not complete the application without
having reviewed that page.
Third, the agreement in this case is a clickwrap agreement
in which an applicant necessarily checks the box adjacent to the
19
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acknowledgment of the terms and conditions to indicate his
agreement with the AAU terms and conditions listed, one of which
is compliance with the contents of the AAU Code Book. The
declaration of Debra Kimbrell shows that it would have been
impossible for the plaintiff to complete his membership
application without checking the box that gave assent to the
terms and conditions. See Sultan v. Coinbase, Inc., 354 F. Supp.
3d 156, 161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The plaintiff therefore assented
to the terms and conditions when he checked the box indicating
that he was aware of the existence of the clickwrap agreement.
See Armstead v. Starbucks Corp., No. 17-cv-1163, 2017 WL
5593519, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2017) (“Meyer concluded that a
party has typically consented to arbitration when she agreed to
a ‘clickwrap’ or ‘click-through’ agreement.”). Moreover, the
language that “[b]y submitting an application, the applicant
agrees to comply with the provisions of the AAU Code,” contained
in the “terms and conditions” box on the AAU application screen,
is a “clear prompt directing users to read the [AAU Code Book]
and signaling that their acceptance of the benefit of
registration would be subject to contractual terms.” Meyer, 868
F.3d at 78-79. 5

5 It appears that the plaintiff in this case also had actual notice that he
would be bound by the terms and conditions in the AAU Code. As the plaintiff
stated in his declaration, he “remember[s] a section that talked about terms
and conditions for background check and another yellow box that talked about
terms and conditions of membership. The second terms and conditions box

20
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Fourth, the fact that notice about the terms and conditions
of AAU membership was both spatially and temporally coupled to
the applicant’s submission of an application further indicates
that the plaintiff had “reasonable notice” that he would be
bound by the attendant terms and conditions upon becoming an AAU
member. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (“In addition to being
spatially coupled with the mechanism for manifesting assent –
i.e., the register button – the notice is temporally coupled.”).
In this case, the check box in which a user manifested assent to
the terms and conditions contained in the AAU Code Book appeared
in close proximity to the two hyperlinks to the AAU Code Book
and all were contained within the box plainly labeled “Terms and
Conditions – Digital Signature.” Notice of the terms and
conditions of membership, including being bound by the contents
of the AAU Code Book was also temporally coupled to the
plaintiff’s application because notice appeared on the
application page itself and therefore notice is given to an
applicant “simultaneously to enrollment, thereby connecting the
contractual terms to the services to which they apply.” Id.
Based on these facts, the plaintiff had “reasonable notice”
that upon completing his membership application with the AAU and

talked about how membership was not guaranteed by just filling out the
application and that members had to comply with the AAU Code and its
constitution and rules.” Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 10.

21

Case 1:19-cv-10545-JGK Document 27 Filed 06/16/20 Page 22 of 30

becoming a member, he would be bound by the arbitration
provision indisputably contained in the AAU Code Book that could
be accessed through the hyperlinks conspicuously displayed on
the AAU membership application page. The plaintiff’s arguments
to the contrary are without merit.
The plaintiff argues that because he applied for membership
on an iPhone using a web browser and the AAU application was not
compatible for smartphone use, he did not have reasonable notice
that he would be bound by the AAU Code Book. Specifically, the
plaintiff complains that he “had to move the screen back and
forth for each line of text” and zoom in and out because the
full application was not visible on the iPhone screen at one
time. Hidalgo Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. A. However, the plaintiff does not
dispute that even though he used his iPhone to complete the
membership application, there was a check box for him to click
to agree to the “terms and conditions.” In fact, the plaintiff
states that he remembers seeing the “terms and conditions” box
when he applied for membership. The plaintiff therefore had
reasonable notice of the need to agree to the terms and
conditions even though he used an iPhone to complete his AAU
membership application.
In any event, the relevant question is whether a
“reasonably prudent smartphone user” would have inquiry notice
that he would be bound by the contract provisions contained in
22
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the AAU Code Book upon completing the AAU membership
application. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77-78. The plaintiff points
to no authority for the proposition that a reasonably prudent
smartphone user does not have inquiry notice of terms and
conditions when the user physically checks a box indicating that
the user understands and agrees to the terms and conditions. See
Peter, 2020 WL 1967568, at *4 (finding that in the context of
the plaintiffs’ argument that the terms and conditions would not
have been readable on a smartphone that “Plaintiffs cite no
authority regarding acceptable font size in the digital
context.”). Moreover, the plaintiff fails to articulate why a
“reasonably prudent smartphone user” would not have reasonable
notice of the hyperlinks on the AAU application page simply
because the smartphone user had to scroll around and zoom in and
out on certain text on the smartphone screen to complete the
application. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77-78.
The plaintiff also argues that he should not be bound by
the arbitration provision in the AAU Code Book because it was
not obvious that the AAU Code Book contained contractual
language rather than simply a general code of conduct governing
matters like sportsmanship at AAU events. The text in the
application stated that “Membership in any category may be
granted only after an application is submitted and approved. By
submitting an application, the applicant agrees to comply with
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the provisions of the AAU Code, including its constitution,
bylaws, policies, procedures, regulations, and rules.” Kimbrell
Decl. ¶ 7 (color in original). The plaintiff provides no support
for the argument that the phrase “the AAU Code, including its
constitution, bylaws, policies, procedures, regulations, and
rules” does not provide “reasonable notice” to an applicant that
the applicant could be bound contractually by provisions
contained in the AAU Code. The relevant portion of the AAU
membership application is labeled “Terms and Conditions –
Digital Signature,” which is standard language used in web-based
contracts to indicate the existence of contractual language. See
generally, Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (discussing Uber’s “terms and
conditions”). There is no merit or authority for the plaintiff’s
argument that he did not have “reasonable notice” that the AAU
Code Book created an enforceable contract between the parties.
The plaintiff also argues that because the arbitration
provision was allegedly “hidden” in the middle of the roughly
170-page AAU Code Book accessible through the hyperlinks, he did
not have notice of the arbitration provision. But the fact that
an applicant on the AAU Website, such as the plaintiff, was
required to click through multiple hyperlinks - first to the AAU
Code Book, then to the “Policies” chapter – to reach the
specific part of the AAU Code Book containing the arbitration
provision does not mean that the plaintiff cannot be bound by
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the arbitration provision because “clicking the hyperlinked
phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over
the cruise ticket [containing an enforceable forum-selection
clause at issue in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 587-88 (1991)]” to read the fine print. Fteja v.
Facebook, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Feld, 2020
WL 1047055, at *5 (“Whether Feld actually clicked on the
hyperlinked terms to read the TOS or the Privacy Policy is
immaterial; what matters is that notice of these terms was
reasonably conspicuous.”).
The plaintiff’s argument that he cannot be bound by the
arbitration provision because he either did not or could not
have been expected to read the full 170-page document contained
in the AAU Code Book runs counter to well-settled principles of
contract law. Under “New York law, a customer does not have the
right to avoid a contract on the ground that he did not read
it.” Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 73-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases); Ragone v. Atl. Video at
Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Further,
Ragone asserts that she did not read the arbitration agreement
before signing it. But this is of no moment . . . .”).
Additionally, an applicant would not have to scroll through the
entire roughly 170-page AAU Code Book because the AAU Code Book
Screen contained a much shorter table of contents. Under the
25

Case 1:19-cv-10545-JGK Document 27 Filed 06/16/20 Page 26 of 30

“Policies” section of the AAU Code Book table of contents was a
section clearly labeled “Binding Arbitration.”
The plaintiff has failed to raise any issue of triable fact
as to whether he had “reasonable notice” that he would be bound
by the arbitration provision contained in the AAU Code Book upon
completing his application for membership in the AAU. There is
therefore no dispute that the plaintiff assented to the
arbitration provision when he checked the box on the AAU
membership application page indicating his agreement with all
the terms and conditions listed and then submitted the
membership application. See Sultan, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 162.
C.
The next question is whether the particular claims brought
by the plaintiff against the defendant are within the scope of
the arbitration provision.
The arbitration provision provides that “by applying for
AAU membership (or having a third party submit an application
for membership in the AAU on behalf of the application), or upon
entering any AAU event, the applicant/member/entrant and the AAU
agree to submit all civil dispute(s) arising out of or during
the term of membership to binding arbitration administered by
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in accordance with
its consumer arbitration rules.” Kimbrell Decl., Ex. C. The
arbitration provision further provides that “the parties declare
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that it is their clear and unmistakable intent for the
arbitrator to determine any and all questions of arbitrability,
if any. Any objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or
validity of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the
arbitrator.” Id.
The plaintiff argues principally that because the
plaintiff’s payment information was stolen from AAU’s website
when he applied for membership on May 16, 2019, thirteen days
before the plaintiff’s AAU membership began, the dispute between
the plaintiff and the defendant in this case does not “arise[e]
out of or during the term of membership[.]”
However, this Court cannot decide the issue whether the
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant is arbitrable
because the parties agreed to “empower an arbitrator to decide
issues of arbitrability,” and that empowerment “serves as clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate
such issues to an arbitrator.” Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 208.
Courts have upheld and enforced delegation clauses similar to
the clause in this case, which principally states that “it is
[the parties’] clear and unmistakable intent for the arbitrator
to determine any and all questions of arbitrability, if any” and
that “[a]ny objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or
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validity of the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the
arbitrator.” See, e.g., Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp.
3d 507, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). 6
In light of the broad delegation to the arbitrator of
issues of arbitrability, the plaintiff’s argument that his
claims are not covered by the arbitration provision because the
claims do not “aris[e] out of or during the term of membership”
is an argument that must be submitted to the arbitrator in the
first instance. See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019) (“When the parties’ contract
delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court
may not override the contract. In those circumstances, a court
possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue. That is
true even if the court thinks that the argument that the
arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly
groundless.”); Olsen v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 18-cv-3388

6

Although the defendant did not rely on the arbitration provision’s clause
stating that arbitration between the parties will be “administered by the
American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) in accordance with its consumer
arbitration rules” for the argument that the arbitrator must decide issues of
arbitrability, the incorporation of AAA rules in the arbitration provision
constitutes independent “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties
intended that the arbitrator decide issues of arbitrability. See Sollinger v.
SmileDirectClub, LLC, No. 19-cv-5977, 2020 WL 774135, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
18, 2020) (“One example of ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ is the parties’
choice to ‘incorporate by reference the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association,’ because the AAA’s rules include an instruction that arbitrators
are to determine their own jurisdiction.”) (alterations omitted) (quoting
Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 211), appeal docketed, No. 20-965 (2d Cir. Mar. 17,
2020); Offshore Exploration and Production LLC v. Morgan Stanley Private
Bank, N.A., 986 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same), aff’d, 626 F.
App’x (2d Cir. 2015).
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& 18-cv-4972, 2019 WL 3779190, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2019).
Therefore, all of the plaintiff’s claims must be submitted to
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration provision
contained in the AAU Code Book. It will be for the arbitrator to
decide whether any of the plaintiff’s claims are beyond the
scope of the arbitration agreement.
IV.
The defendant requests that the Court stay this case
pending arbitration if it grants the defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration.
The FAA provides that where a court is called upon to
adjudicate a motion to compel arbitration, “the court in which
such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. A stay of the
proceedings is mandatory “after all claims have been referred to
arbitration and a stay [has been] requested.” Katz v. Cellco
P’ship, 794 F.3d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 2015).
In this case, all claims have been ordered to be submitted
to arbitration and the defendant has requested that the Court
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enter a stay of proceedings in this Court pending the outcome of
the arbitration. Therefore, this case is stayed pending the
outcome of the arbitration.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the arguments of the
parties. To the extent not discussed above, the arguments are
either moot or without merit. The motion to compel arbitration
is granted. The motion to stay this action pending the outcome
of arbitration is granted. The parties should report back to the
Court promptly at the conclusion of the arbitration. The Clerk
is directed to stay this case. The Clerk is also directed to
close Docket Nos. 10 and 24.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
June 16, 2020
____ /s/ John G. Koeltl_____
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge
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